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I 
Introduction 
On 11 February 1983, the President of Ecuador, 
His Excellency Dr. Osvaldo Hurtado, sent us a 
letter in which, after emphasizing the serious-
ness of the present international economic situa-
tion, he noted that "the world has not known 
such a serious and prolonged crisis since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s". 
In his communication President Hurtado 
made two statements of great significance. The 
first of these is that the magnitude and intensity 
of the crisis today facing Latin America are such 
that they severely jeopardize in the region, as 
never before, ". . .the social peace of nations and 
the stability of the democratic system: in brief, 
the fate of vast human communities which are 
seeing their unsolved social problems grow 
worse day by day, and are fearfully becoming 
aware of the possibility of total disaster". The 
second is that, despite the magnitude of these 
difficulties "the peoples of Latin America and 
the Caribbean have the necessary qualities for 
overcoming them". 
It is on the basis of this clear perception of 
the world and regional situation that President 
Hurtado asked us, on behalf of the Government 
of Ecuador ". . .to prepare as soon as possible a 
set of proposals designed to develop the re-
sponse capacity of Latin America and to consoli-
date its systems of co-operation". 
It is in pursuance of such a clear mandate 
that we have prepared the present document, 
which reflects our own opinions, enriched by 
the contributions of the Secretariats of ECLA 
and SELA and the much appreciated collabora-
tion of the guiding bodies of the Latin American 
Integration Association (ALADI), the Board of 
the Cartagena Agreement (JUNAC), the Centre 
for Latin American Monetary Studies (CEMLA) 
and the Latin American Energy Organization 
(OLADE), which sent us valuable views and sug-
gestions for which we are most grateful. 
This document is centered on an idea 
which is clearly expressed in President Hur-
tado's letter and which we fully share: the 
economic crisis through which the region is pas-
sing is the severest suffered since the war: it af-
fects all the Latin American countries, in differ-
ent ways, with a previously unknown degree of 
universality, and its special features make it* 
qualitatively different from any other recent ex-
perience. 
In these circumstances, Latin America 
more than ever needs to make a profound and 
self-critical analysis of the development model 
based on a type of industrialization highly de-
pendent on the exterior and on the consump-
tion of the middle and upper strata of its 
societies and the maintenance of a very high 
share of basic commodities in the region's ex-
ports: —a model which furthermore, in recent 
years, has come to depend increasingly on the 
massive and increasing procurement of external 
resources. 
Consequently, the urgent need to tackle 
the pressing problems of the short term should 
not divert us from the objectives of working to 
formulate new approaches which, as well as al-
lowing us to face up to the crisis and preserve 
the economic and social advances achieved in 
the past, will help to lay the foundation for a 
new type of economic expansion which is more 
solid, more dynamic, less vulnerable and more 
equitable than that observed so far. 
The very nature of the crisis means that it 
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goes beyond the strictly economic area, as Presi-
dent Hurtado also suggests in his letter. Thus, 
any solution to the present challenges will only 
be viable to the extent that it proposes accept-
able formulas for the distribution of the burden 
of adjustment both between the different social 
groups within the countries and between the 
different nations. This task is ultimately the re-
sponsibility of the political organs, which are 
faced with complex dilemmas. 
It is also well known that in spite of the 
common features which exist in the region, 
there are differences between the various Latin 
American countries and between the situations 
each of them is facing in the present crisis. Fur-
thermore, despite the symptoms of recovery 
which the United States economy has begun to 
show since the beginning of the year, there is as 
yet no clear picture regarding the future evolu-
tion of the industrialized nations as a whole, and 
still less regarding the consequences of the sig-
nificant changes taking place in their structures 
of production. 
All these factors undoubtedly make it diffi-
cult to give general and definitive answers on 
how to tackle the complex and varied problems 
with which the present situation is facing the re-
gion. On the other hand, however, they also 
represent for us a renewal of the Latin Ameri-
can challenges which marked the birth of our 
institutions. 
In the light of these considerations, we 
have prepared a report which seeks: i) to de-
scribe the nature and scope of the economic 
crisis affecting Latin America; ii) to question 
the present adjustment process, which, because 
of the insufficiency of international co-opera-
tion and its inappropriateness to the demands 
of the present situation, creates external condi-
tions for the Latin American countries which 
heighten the economic and social costs they 
must pay in order to overcome the crisis; and 
iii) to identify some priority guidelines and pro-
posals to stimulate joint action by Latin America 
to overcome the crisis, particularly on the inter-
national and regional levels. 
It should be noted, however, that the lines 
of action suggested in the present document 
have been prepared according to a deliberately 
selective criterion, and we have sought to avoid 
detailed consideration of a large number of 
measures of widely varying importance and na-
ture. Moreover, in presenting these guidelines, 
analysis of their justification has generally been 
reduced very considerably in order to keep the 
length of the text within reasonable limits. For 
all these reasons, we have concentrated our ef-
forts on suggesting some general bases which 
could serve, in our view, for the formulation of 
an actions programme aimed at taking full ad-
vantage of the opportunities open to Latin 
America for overcoming the repercussions of 
the international crisis, as we were requested to 
do by President Hurtado. 
Our reflections are also inspired by the 
conviction that it is necessary to face up to the 
crisis by means of a response of a regional na-
ture which enables us to avoid the risks of a 
fatalistic approach deriving from the pessimism 
naturally felt in the face of the long lists of de-
mands which hardly seem compatible with the 
challenges and possibilities offered by the pre-
sent situation. The power of negotiation of the 
Latin American countries could in fact be in-
creased considerably by adopting a concerted 
position based on a selective programme of ac-
tion with clear priorities, firmly resting on the 
idea of regional co-operation. 
It is our view, then, that Latin America can 
use and mobilize its capacity to respond to the 
negative effects of the international crisis and 
can advance towards the establishment of a new 
Latin American economic and social order 
which is more dynamic, equitable-and stable, as 
well as involving greater mutual support. 
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II 
The nature and scope of the economic crisis 
affecting Latin America 
A. T H E INTERNATIONAL CRISIS 
The 1980s has begun with an economic reces-
sion which is the longest and most intense suf-
fered by the world economy since the war. In it, 
the negative effects associated with a downward 
phase in the economic cycle have been aggra-
vated by the adjustment policies applied, by the 
intensification of some structural shortcomings 
in the central economies, and by certain uncor-
rected imbalances in international economic re-
lations. 
As well as being exceptionally severe, the 
present crisis has been very generalized. Thus, 
due mainly to the impressive internationaliza-
tion of the individual economies in recent de-
cades, only a few countries have escaped its ef-
fects, so that progress has suffered, albeit to dif-
ferent degrees, in both the developed and de-
veloping countries, the socialist and capitalist 
economies, the oil-exporting and oil-importing 
countries, and the large, medium-sized and 
small economies alike. 
In the industrialized economies, the crisis 
has manifested itself in a decline in production, 
a sharp drop in investment —which will weaken 
their future growth rate—, an exceptional in-
crease in unemployment, and unusually severe 
and persistent inflation. 
The most distinctive feature of the crisis, 
however, has been the exceptionally high level 
reached by real interest rates. As a result of the 
high priority which the industrialized countries 
have given in recent years to the reduction of in-
flation and of their considerable fiscal deficits, 
and above all the enormous emphasis given in 
this task in some of those countries to the con-
trol of the money supply, interest rates have 
risen markedly in the main international finan-
cial centres since 1978, and in the two-year 
period 1981-1982 they reached levels in real 
terms comparable only with those registered 
during the Great Depression. It is true that since 
the middle of last year nominal interest rates 
have gone down, but as their decline has been 
accompanied by a considerable drop in inflation 
in most of the industrialized economies, they are 
still two or three times as high in real terms as 
the average levels prevailing since the war. 
T h e persistence of abnormally high real 
interest rates has thus become a key element in 
the international economic situation, and such 
problems as the drop in productive investments 
—which have been incapable of competing with 
financial investments in recent years— are 
largely attributable to the levels of interest rates. 
In the international sphere, high interest rates 
—and above all the sharp variations in them— 
have been one of the main causes of the erratic 
movements of capital and, through these, the 
equally marked fluctuations in exchange rates. 
The exceptionally high level of real interest 
rates has also been a factor in the sharp reduc-
tion in the demand for stocks (including com-
modity stocks), and this in turn explains much 
of the deterioration in the terms of trade of the 
developing economies. 
As already noted, since the beginning of 
this year there have been some signs of 
economic recovery in certain industrialized 
economies, especially the United States. Fur-
thermore, the progress made in some central 
countries in the struggle against inflation has 
made possible a certain slackening of the mone-
tary containment measures which has stimu-
lated global demand and, in particular, pur-
chases of certain consumer durables —an item 
of considerable importance in the dynamics of 
the economic cycle of those countries. 
In certain circles, these indicators have 
given rise to relatively optimistic opinions re-
garding the possibility that the recovery of the 
industrialized economies may be consolidated 
and that its probable beneficial effects will 
spread —mainly through international trade 
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and the drop in interest rates— to the 
peripheral economies. 
These views are far from being shared by 
all, however, and certain circles continue to be 
skeptical regarding the prospects of a general, 
intensive and durable reactivation of the indus-
trialized economies. These circles note that gen-
erally speaking macroeconomic policies are still 
highly restrictive in the central countries, and 
they also emphasize that, mainly as a conse-
quence of the high interest rates still prevailing 
in the United States, the external deficits of a 
number of industrialized countries continue to 
be very large. Furthermore, it is obvious that the 
recovery of levels of investment in those coun-
tries has been held up by the joint effect of high 
interest rates, the rather generalized excess of 
idle capacity in industry, and especially the pre-
The nature of international economic relations 
is such that the recent negative evolution of the 
central economies has severely affected the per-
formance of the developing countries and, in 
particular, that of Latin America, which became 
intensely integrated into the world economy in 
recent years through a varied range of 
mechanisms of trade, financial and technologi-
cal relations. 
The world economic crisis has spread over 
the region through three main channels. 
The first of these was international trade. 
As in other recessions, the stagnation of the 
economic activity of the industrialized countries 
has had unfavourable effects on their demand 
for imports and, hence, on the growth rate of 
international trade. On this occasion, however, 
these adverse consequences have been rein-
forced by the resurgence of protectionist prac-
tices in the trade policies of many central 
economies, which became more frequent and 
severe as unemployment increased and the re-
cession continued. In these circumstances, the 
volume of international trade —whose rapid ex-
pansion had played a fundamental part in world 
economic growth since the war— increased only 
vailing uncertainty regarding the future evolu-
tion of the economic situation. 
Another limiting factor is the persistence 
of the conflicts between the trade policies of 
some central countries, which could even be-
come more intense in the years to come unless 
there is a realignment of their currency values. 
The two elements which cause most con-
cern and which directly threaten the prompt re-
covery of the central countries, however, are the 
continued simultaneous application of recessive 
policies in most of them and their lack of wil-
lingness to begin to apply, in a simultaneous and 
coherent manner, policies aimed at generating 
the co-ordinated reactivation of their 
economies. This position is particularly serious 
in the case of those OECD member countries 
which have largely brought their inflation rates 
under control and have thus managed to reduce 
the size of their external deficits. 
slightly in 1980, almost completely stagnated in 
1981, and actually went down by 2% in 1982. 
As was to be expected, this progressive loss 
of dynamism of world trade sharply affected 
both the volume and prices of Latin America's 
exports. Thus, with the persistence for the third 
year running of the recession in the indus-
trialized countries and a drop in the volume of 
world trade in absolute terms, 1982 saw the 
complete disappearance of any expansion in 
real terms of Latin America's exports, which 
had increased between 1976 and 1981 at the ex-
ceptionally high rate of around 8% per year. 
The contraction in world trade also led to 
a sharp deterioration in 1982 in Latin America's 
terms of trade. The decline was particularly 
serious in the case of the non-oil-exporting 
countries, since in them the 1982 drop came on 
top of those which had taken place in the previ-
ous four years. Consequently, the average value 
of their terms of trade in the three-year period 
1980-1982 was even below that registered be-
tween the years 1931 and 1933, which rep-
resented the most critical period of the Great 
Depression. 
The second transmission mechanism con-
B. T H E TRANSMISSION OF T H E INTERNATIONAL CRISIS 
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sisted of the high interest rates prevailing on in-
ternational financial markets. These helped to 
trigger and accentuate the Latin American crisis 
in two complementary ways. On the one hand, 
by hindering the recovery of the industrialized 
economies, they tended to reduce the latter's de-
mand for Latin America's exports. On the other 
hand, by raising the external debt service bur-
den —the size of which had already grown very 
rapidly in previous years— they helped to in-
crease enormously the current account deficit 
and obliged the countries to make a correspond-
ingly much greater real transfer of resources to 
the exterior. 
It is worth recalling in this respect that, 
from the point of view of the debtor countries, 
the greater or lesser real sacrifice involved in the 
payment of interest on the external debt de-
pends not only on the level of the nominal inter-
est rate, but also on the relation between the lat-
ter and the variations in the prices of export 
products. In other words, the amount of real re-
sources which the debtor country must transfer 
to the exterior in order to service the debt will 
be all the greater in proportion as the nominal 
interest rate rises and the average price of the 
debtor country's exports drops. 
This was exactly the situation which Latin 
America had to face in the period 1981-1982. 
As already noted, not only did interest rates 
reach exceptionally high levels on international 
financial markets during this period, but there 
was simultaneously a sharp decline in the unit 
value of Latin American exports. The results of 
this coincidence were dramatic: the real rate of 
interest which Latin America had to pay was 
around 24%, thus making it four times as much 
as the rate payable in those years by debtors in 
the central countries, even though the latter 
rates, as already noted, were themselves the 
highest registered in the last half century. 
Finally, a third way in which the recession 
spread from the central economies to Latin 
America was the abrupt reversal of the net flow 
of capital, mainly as a result of the radical 
change which took place in 1982 in the interna-
tional commercial banks' ideas on the advisabil-
ity of continuing the rapid increase in their 
loans to the region. Thus, the net inflow of capi-
tal, which had grown very fast between the mid-
1970s and 1981, slumped dramatically in 1982 
to a little over US$ 19 billion, or less than half 
the level of the year before. This violent contrac-
tion in the net inflow of capital, together with 
the extraordinary increase in net remittances of 
profits and interest, more than offset the effects 
of the turnaround in the trade balance —which, 
after turning in a deficit of almost US$ 2 billion 
in 1981, generated a surplus of US$ 8.8 billion 
in 1982— and made it necessary to finance a 
considerable part of the current account imbal-
ance from the international reserves. T h e pay-
ments problems were further aggravated by the 
simultaneous reduction in the average term of 
the external loans obtained. 
The force with which the problems of the 
world economy made themselves felt in Latin 
America was also due partly, however, to the 
economic policies applied in many countries of 
the region from the mid-1970s onwards, which 
promoted a form of economic growth heavily 
dependent on the inflow of capital from the ex-
terior. 
In other words, it was the special combina-
tion of adverse changes on the international 
scene already described, long-standing struc-
tural problems, and economic policies exces-
sively linked to financing from abroad which 
put an end, in the early 1980s, to the dynamic 
growth process registered by the economies of 
the region in general between 1950 and 1980, 
when the gross domestic product of Latin 
America increased fivefold, while manufactur-
ing production grew more than sixfold. 
From 1981 onwards there was a sharp 
drop in the growth rate of economic activity and 
in 1982 such activity even went down in absolute 
terms —something which had never happened 
in the previous 40 years. This marked loss of 
dynamism was accompanied by a sharp rise in 
the rates of open unemployment and an in-
crease in the various forms of underemploy-
ment. At the same time, there was a trend to-
wards the generalization of inflationary proces-
ses, which attained an intensity and persistence 
that it would have been difficult to image only a 
few years before. These unfavourable changes 
at the domestic level were closely linked with 
other no less serious changes in the external sec-
tor, the most obvious manifestations of which 
have been the severe balance-of-payments 
crises, the frequent and in some cases enormous 
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rises in exchange rates, and the drain on the in-
ternational reserves. 
A particularly disquieting phenomenon 
observed in recent years, however, has been the 
high level of external indebtedness affecting the 
region. The Financial permissiveness shown by 
the international private banking system in the 
second half of the 1970s and the intense and 
persistent efforts it made to loan its financial 
surpluses to Latin America encouraged a policy 
of external indebtedness on a scale without any 
precedent in the region in the last half century. 
There were few countries in Latin America 
which did not follow this policy in order to fi-
nance domestic policies with widely varying 
aims, ranging from some which involved large 
investments that overestimated the future ex-
pansion of domestic and international markets 
to others which promoted and exaggerated ex-
pansion of consumption —especially of im-
ported goods— or a big increase in defence 
spending. In recent years, furthermore, a con-
siderable and growing proportion of the exter-
nal financing was used to pay the servicing costs 
of the accumulated debt, so that this situation 
was accompanied in practice by a reduction in 
the real transfer of resources to Latin America. 
In many Latin American economies the 
decline in economic activity has also been ac-
companied by profound crises in the system of 
production and the financial situation of enter-
prises, which have led to the bankruptcy or clos-
ing down of many production units in industry, 
agriculture and commerce. This in turn has 
helped to bring about a deterioration in the 
quality of bank loan portfolios and has finally 
affected the solvency and viability of much of 
the private financial system. A situation of wide-
spread insolvency has thus been created for 
which there is no precedent in the last half cen-
tury both from the point of view of its quantita-
tive dimensions and the number and variety of 
enterprises affected. 
Another manifestation of the crisis has 
been the pronounced deterioration in many 
countries in the economic situation of the State, 
whose revenue has been affected by the drop in 
external trade and the stagnation or decline in 
domestic economic activity. All this has helped 
to generate big deficits in the public finances 
and to speed up the rates of inflation. In turn, 
attempts to bring the latter under control have 
frequently led to abrupt cuts in State spending, 
and especially in public investment, thus further 
depressing the levels of domestic activity. 
In spite of this, in many countries there 
has at the same time been a tendency towards 
the acceleration of inflation. In particular, infla-
tion has reached unprecedented levels of inten-
sity in countries which have been forced to de-
value their currencies abruptly in order to tackle 
severe disequilibria in their balance of pay-
ments. 
As a result of the decline in economic activ-
ity, the simultaneous acceleration of inflation, 
and the orthodox-type stabilization policies ap-
plied in order to bring down the rate of price in-
creases, there has been a marked deterioration, 
in many countries, in the living conditions of the 
poorer groups, which have been affected both 
by the pronounced declines in real wages and 
the rise in unemployment and underemploy-
ment. 
Il l 
The inequity of the current adjustment process and the 
need for an alternative approach 
A. THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 
The present international crisis and the asym-
metry of the adjustment process have drastically 
changed the conditions of external trade and fi-
nancing of Latin America, making inevitable the 
introduction of profound changes in the 
economic policy of the countries of the region. 
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This has had painful and inequitable economic 
and social consequences, while moreover the re-
sults obtained have not been in keeping with the 
efforts made. 
In these circumstances, an important chal-
lenge facing economic policy is that of minimiz-
ing the social costs involved in the adjustment 
and distributing them more equitably both be-
tween creditor and debtor countries and be-
tween the various social groups and economic 
agents within the countries. 
In recent months the International Mone-
tary Fund has been participating actively in the 
design of adjustment programmes which pro-
vide for the reprogramming of external in-
debtedness, together with balance-of-payments 
support credits. Under these programmes, gov-
ernments have not only received additional re-
sources provided by the IMF, but have also had 
access to contributions from the private banks 
aimed at relieving the burden of external debt 
servicing in line with the terms of the negotia-
tions furthered by the Fund itself. In almost all 
cases, the adjustment programmes thus agreed 
on stipulate that these external resources must 
be supplemented with surpluses on the balance-
of-payments trade account, which the countries 
must generate principally through the adoption 
of suitable exchange rate, monetary and fiscal 
policies. 
Although it must be admitted that the 
Fund has introduced a greater degree of flexi-
bility into these programmes compared with its 
traditional terms, they are still based fundamen-
tally on policies which must act through aggre-
gate demand and necessarily include a pro-
nounced recessive element, since it is largely 
through the reduction of domestic demand that 
it is hoped to generate the trade surpluses con-
sidered essential for facing up to the debt servic-
ing. 
This recessive element in the adjustment 
policies applied is determined, ultimately, by the 
magnitude of the external imbalances affecting 
the countries of Latin America and the particu-
lar state of their balance of payments. As al-
ready noted, the equilibrium of the external ac-
counts has been affected by a number of factors 
which are beyond the direct action of the coun-
tries and which, in their turn, tend to reduce 
considerably the inflow of foreign exchange and 
increase payments to the exterior. Thus, while 
the income from exports has gone down both 
because of drops in prices and reductions in the 
amounts exported, and the net procurement of 
capital has slumped violently, the outflow of for-
eign exchange has tended to increase as a result 
of the high spreads over basic interest rates and 
the management commissions charged by the 
banks in their refinancing programmes. In 
many cases, these higher costs have wiped out or 
at least partly neutralized the effect of the de-
clines in nominal interest rates registered in re-
cent months. 
It must be concluded, then, that in spite of 
the additional resources provided or mobilized 
by the IMF, and mainly because of the enor-
mous magnitude of the external debt servicing 
burden, the objective of bringing the external 
accounts into balance will call for some degree 
of recessive adjustment, through the compres-
sion of domestic economic activity. 
There are three problems, however, which 
give rise to severe reservations regarding the ad-
justment processes now in progress. These are, 
firstly, the ineffectiveness so far shown by the 
policies applied in order to achieve the desired 
objectives; secondly, the considerable economic 
and social costs associated with these policies; 
and finally, the doubtful capacity of the coun-
tries to keep up these policies for more or less 
prolonged periods. 
Thus, if these adjustment policies go 
beyond certain limits they may generate de-
clines in economic activity, drops in investment, 
or even destroy the system of production, and 
this will seriously affect not only current levels 
of consumption and well-being, but also the ca-
pacity of the economies for future recovery. 
Likewise, if the recessive situation of the 
international economy continues or its eventual 
reactivation does not rapidly make itself felt in 
the economies of the region, the continued ap-
plication of such recessive policies could even 
threaten to overstep the limits of social and 
political tolerance of our societies, so that not 
only would such policies be difficult to apply, 
but their execution would have unforeseeable 
consequences both for the Latin American 
countries and for the international community. 
The foregoing does not mean, of course, 
that we do not give due credit to the Trojan ef-
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forts which the financial authorities and govern-
ments of our countries have been making to 
handle an extremely difficult external payments 
situation and honour the external commitments 
assumed, within the limited possibilities offered 
by the presently available international financial 
co-operation. 
Special reference may be made, in this re-
spect, to the enormous adjustment effort made 
by the countries of the region in 1982, which, as 
already noted, enabled them to replace the 
trade deficit of the year before with a trade 
surplus of some US$ 8.8 billion. 
Nor does it mean that we do not appreciate 
the imaginative initiatives put into practice by 
the International Monetary Fund in order to 
tackle the current payments problems, with the 
participation of the financial authorities of the 
industrialized countries, the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, and the private banking sys-
tem. 
What does worry us, however, are the limi-
tations and inconsistencies of international sup-
port arrangements which do not seem to be 
qualitatively or quantitatively adequate to deal 
with the fundamental and generalized state of 
imbalance in which the countries of the region 
are sunk, and which, as already noted, cannot be 
compared with anything that has happened 
since the war. 
We also have reservations regarding the 
viability of an adjustment based on contraction 
policies which must be undertaken by all coun-
tries together, aimed at collectively increasing 
exports and jointly reducing imports. It must be 
perfectly clear that unless there is a group of 
countries which is willing to accept a deficit on 
its trade account, it will not be possible for a 
numerous group of other countries to generate 
a surplus. Consequently, the efforts of the latter 
to expand their exports and compress their im-
ports will simply aggravate the recession in 
them. 
It is also clear that the possibility of solving 
in the medium term the financial problems 
raised by the accumulated external indebted-
ness is- closely dependent on the possibilities of 
expanding the region's exports, and these, in 
turn, as they stand at present, are conditioned 
by the evolution of world trade. In the final 
analysis, if the acute financial problems of the 
present time are to be overcome, it is indispens-
able that there should be a recovery in the prices 
and volumes of Latin America's exports. It is 
therefore a matter of the deepest concern that 
at the same time that our countries are shoul-
dering the enormous costs involved in policies 
aimed at bringing the balance of payments into 
equilibrium and honouring their external finan-
cial commitments, the protectionist policies of 
the creditor countries should keep on growing 
ever stronger. 
In our opinion, this failure to take much 
account in the adjustment programmes of the 
intimate links existing between the trade and fi-
nancial aspects is undoubtedly one of their great 
shortcomings. 
We also feel that the additional refinanc-
ing resources mobilized by the adjustment poli-
cies should be accompanied by long-term exter-
nal funds for the support of domestic invest-
ment and development programmes. Unfortu-
nately, in the present circumstances not only has 
there been a violent drop in private financial re-
sources but there has been no corresponding 
strengthening of the international public fi-
nancing agencies. On the contrary, it is increas-
ingly difficult to obtain loans from such agencies 
and, at the same time, tendencies towards 
graduation are prevailing in them which, by 
definition, restrict the region's possibilities of 
gaining access to public international credit. 
To sum up, then, the view prevails in inter-
national financing agencies and the govern-
ments of creditor countries that it is possible to 
handle the present balance-of-payments crisis 
through traditional support mechanisms, back-
ed up by the recent policies of the IMF in associ-
ation with the private banks. This position as-
sumes explicity or implicitly that there will be a 
prompt, strong and lasting recovery of the 
world economy. 
These positions are controverted, how-
ever, by dissenting opinions within the central 
countries themselves which reflect concern over 
the intensity and duration of the adjustment 
being demanded from the developing coun-
tries, its social and political effects, and the di-
sastrous consequences which a situation of gen-
eral cessation of payments or panic could have 
for the international banking system and even 
the world economy as a whole. In view of these 
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concerns, global solutions of another type are 
advocated in which coping with the payments 
crisis of the developing countries becomes an es-
sential part of the economic reactivation poli-
cies of the centres. 
In order to honour their external commit-
ments, the countries of the region have put into 
effect extremely painful adjustment processes 
which are severely affecting their economic 
structures and creating serious pressures on 
their social equilibrium. The viability of these 
adjustments depends on the margins of action 
permitted by the presently available interna-
tional co-operation. In many Latin American 
countries, however, increasing doubts are aris-
ing regarding the social and political feasibility 
of this type of solution, the possibility of main-
taining such policies for a significant length of 
The foregoing considerations leave no doubt 
that at present Latin America is facing a serious 
dilemma characterized by three adverse factors 
which mutually reinforce each other: a severe 
world crisis from which it is still not clear how or 
when we are going to emerge; international co-
operation which is inadequate both from the 
point of view of its size and its nature; and an 
adjustment process with recessive characteris-
tics. 
We wish to stress, however, that in our 
view the task of overcoming this extremely com-
plex situation and carrying out in the years to 
come an adjustment process which will at the 
same time make it possible to restore the equilib-
rium of the external accounts and at least pre-
serve the levels of per capita income constitutes 
only the most immediate challenge facing the 
countries of the region, for in the medium term 
they will have to try to overcome another chal-
lenge, no less complex and unavoidable, which 
is that of gradually but firmly changing the style 
of development which has prevailed up to now 
in the region in order to bring in a new kind of 
development which is more dynamic, less vul-
nerable, and above all more equitable. 
In order to do this, the region must carry 
out intensive mobilization of its internal re-
sources through regional co-operation, which is 
time, and the capacity of the economies of the 
region to comply with the agreements signed if 
the present conditions of the world economy 
continue. 
We therefore feel that the time has 
come for the region, as well as drawing atten-
tion to the inadequacy of the present inter-
national co-operation machinery, to bring 
home to the authorities of the industrial-
ized countries and raise in the appropriate 
forums the need to find sources of support 
additional to those at present existing, if a 
way out of the crisis is to be found. A solu-
tion of this nature would not only be in the 
interests of the Latin American countries but 
would also be in line with the interests of 
the international banking system and the re-
activation policies of the centres. 
currently subject to serious tensions deriving 
from the recessive forces imposed by the inter-
national situation itself. In this respect, we are 
convinced that the present time is a suitable one 
for making an appraisal of the achievements of 
regional co-operation, the difficulties it has run 
into, its present and future potential, and the 
most suitable means for making it more effec-
tive and decisively entering on a new stage in the 
process of regional integration. 
Furthermore, in order to progress in over-
coming the difficult problems at present affect-
ing them, the countries of the region must co-
ordinate their international action so as on the 
one hand to promote a reactivation of the world 
economy which provides a suitable external 
framework for them to attain reasonable 
economic growth, and on the other to secure the 
approval of a set of emergency measures by the 
international community which are compatible 
with the magnitude of the external payments 
crisis they are currently facing. 
From Latin America's point of view, the 
desirability of securing the reactivation of the 
international economy stems from the need to 
bring about substantial changes in the external 
conditions of the region, which are essential in 
order to overcome many of the economic prob-
lems currently affecting it or at least bring them 
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down to a manageable size. It is for this reason 
that a co-ordinated programme of reactivation 
of the industrialized economies, which should 
be headed by those countries which have made 
most progress as regards restoring their internal 
stability and balance-of-payments equilibrium, 
is particularly necessary. These measures 
should be directed especially towards securing a 
sustained and substantial decline in real interest 
rates, without which no recovery can be really 
significant or stable. 
The reactivation of the industrialized 
economies alone, however, will not be enough to 
establish a more dynamic, stable and equitable 
international setting. In order to advance in this 
direction we must at the same time incorporate 
into the economic policies of the central coun-
tries fundamental measures which permit the 
solution of the structural problems affecting in-
ternational economic relations, so many times 
called for by the Third World in United Nations 
forums, and so many times postponed as re-
gards their solution. Thus, a reactivation of the 
central economies which is not accompanied by 
significant changes in the fields of basic com-
modities, the opening up of markets, the check-
ing of protectionist policies, or bigger transfers 
of financial resources would have little rele-
The handling of the region's external indebted-
ness against the background of the balance-of-
payments crisis has become the most urgent 
economic problem facing the governments of 
Latin America. The distribution of the cost of 
the adjustment process and to some extent the 
opportunities for economic growth for the rest 
of the decade depend upon its solution. This 
growth will undoubtedly depend upon different 
patterns of financing from those of the past few 
years, 
vanee in overcoming the serious and sometimes 
desperate situation of the peripheral countries. 
It is for this reason —although it is not 
necessary to go into details on this occasion— 
that we feel that the measures approved at the 
recent meetings of the Non-Aligned Countries 
in New Delhi and the Group of 77 in Buenos 
Aires —to which Latin America has given its un-
animous support—are particularly pertinent. 
In this respect, the forthcoming confer-
ence of UNCTAD provides a favourable occa-
sion for demanding the definition and approval 
by the industrialized countries of a set of mini-
mum actions to accompany their reactivation 
policies and make it possible, at the same time, 
to reverse the deterioration in the process of 
world economic development. A powerful pres-
ence of Latin America in this conference is 
therefore absolutely essential. 
As well as supporting a world program-
me of "reactivation with development", Latin 
America's international action should centre its 
attention on establishing a dialogue with the in-
dustrialized countries with which the region 
maintains the bulk of its external trade and fi-
nancial relations, in order to negotiate and 
agree on a set of emergency measures for the 
relief of its acute current problems. 
1. The external debt and the 
balance-of-payments crisis 
This situation has been arrived at mainly be-
cause between 1975 and 1982 the total external 
debt of the region more than quadrupled, rising 
from US$ 67 billion to nearly US$ 300 billion. 
This growth was especially rapid between 1975 
and 1980, when the external indebtedness rose 
at an average annual rate of nearly 25%, i.e., 
substantially faster than the also very high rate 
IV 
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of 18% at which the value of exports from the 
region expanded. This growth in the debt be-
came significantly more moderate in 1982 due 
to the sharp drop in the net inflow of capital. 
The expansion of the total debt was ac-
companied by a considerable change in its ori-
gin and composition. At the beginning of the 
past decade, private flows represented less than 
40% of the total, while in recent years they ex-
ceeded 80%. At the same time medium- and 
long-term credits and those at concessional 
rates of interest were replaced by short- and 
medium-term credits and variable interest 
rates. This implied a sharp deterioration in the 
debt profile of Latin America —by far the least 
favourable of all the regions of the Third 
World— and gradually led to a sharp increase 
in the percentage of export income which had 
to be used to service the debt. 
Seen from the perspective of the whole de-
cade, the responsibility for the generation of the 
excessive external indebtedness was shared be-
tween the indebtedness policies of Latin Ameri-
can countries, the financial permissiveness of 
the private banking system, and the weaknesses 
and inadequacies of the international financial 
mechanisms. 
In the expansive stage of the credit cycle, 
the private banks strenuously competed to invest 
in the region part of the enormous financial 
surpluses which they obtained in the interna-
tional capital markets, especially in those of the 
principal oil-exporting countries. Furthermore, 
quite often certain banks did not make rigorous 
appraisals of creditworthiness, or they overesti-
mated the capacity of the countries to absorb 
funds. At the same time, the combination of 
domestic interest rates higher than those pre-
vailing in international markets and the abun-
dant foreign reserves accumulated by the coun-
tries of the region helped encourage the flow of 
financial resources to be invested in these coun-
tries. 
In addition, the inability of the machinery 
of the international financial institutions to recy-
cle the huge surpluses of the oil countries meant 
that most of the transfers of resources during 
the 1970s were carried out be private banks. 
This external framework, however, sud-
denly changed in recent years. The serious de-
terioration in the terms of trade of the region 
and the paralysation of growth in the volume of 
exports coincided with a sharp rise in real inter-
est rates. This changed the banks' perception of 
the payment capacity of various countries of the 
region and led to a sharp contraction in net 
movements of capital to Latin America. 
This produced an external payments situa-
tion which was impossible to sustain for nearly 
all the countries of the region. T o deal with it, 
many of them had to initiate adjustment proces-
ses based on the reduction of domestic demand, 
or they had to resort to the IMF. As a result, 
since 1981 both the level of domestic economic 
activity and the amount of imports have de-
clined in a number of countries. When these 
expedients were exhausted, most of the Latin 
American countries had to make use of their re-
serves —which fell substantially in 1982— and 
initiate processes of renegotiation of the debt 
with their creditors, in most cases with the par-
ticipation of the International Monetary Fund. 
2. The refinancing agreements 
In the process of refinancing, the private banks 
have assumed commitments to grant additional 
credits supplementing those provided by the 
IMF. The fact that the 'rescue package' includes 
the private banks is an important and innovative 
aspect of the exercises of reprogramming the 
external debt recently effected or now in prog-
ress. > 
However, the insufficiency of these 
mechanisms is obvious when some of their fea-
tures are analysed, for the exercises in re-
scheduling payments offer few prospects for 
economic growth, since the additional resources 
committed by the banks and the Fund are not 
sufficient to cover the payment of interests. At 
the same time, most of the cost of the adjust-
ment and the effort to face the difficulties of 
debt servicing has fallen exclusively on the Latin 
American countries. Moreover, the high mar-
gins paid above the basic interest rates (spreads) 
and the additional commissions for manage-
ment and service have more than doubled the 
cost of refinancing. 
In addition, the negotiations carried out 
have not managed to reduce the uncertainty 
about the financial prospects of the countries 
because, on the one hand, they cover only the 
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debts maturing in the next one or two years and, 
on the other hand, because of the long period of 
time between the declaration of difficulties with 
respect to debt servicing and the final re-
scheduling agreement. Naturally, these uncer-
tainties have had negative effects on the 
economies of the borrowing countries. 
Some of the agreements have also been 
complicated by the policy of certain private 
banks of sharply cutting down or reducing the 
lines of trade credit, which are of great impor-
tance for maintaining the level of international 
trade. 
Moreover, in spite of the intervention of 
As a result of the foregoing, there are serious 
doubts in some international and national cir-
cles regarding the real capacity of the Latin 
American countries to face up to the commit-
ments assumed unless the international 
economic conditions undergo a substantial 
change and at the same time there is a reduction 
of the high economic and social costs associated 
with the present adjustment processes. 
In our view, this points the way to the need 
for a constructive dialogue both among the 
countries of the region and between them and 
the creditor countries, in order to explore the 
viability of new terms and policies more in keep-
ing with the mutual interests of all the parties 
concerned. 
In order to put forward on a new basis a 
different approach to the challenge represented 
by the Latin American external debt, it is neces-
sary to start by recognizing that the principles 
prevailing at present as regards the distribu-
tion of the adjustment cost between debtors and 
creditors are very biased. 
This situation is in sharp contrast with 
what happened in the 1930s, for the Latin 
American external debt at that time had been 
contracted principally through the sale of bonds 
on world markets. Thus, when the debtor coun-
tries began to suffer from the external problems 
generated by the crisis, the price of the bonds 
fell sharply, due above all to the risk of non-pay-
the IMF, the large number of participant banks, 
their different assessments and positions on the 
way of overcoming the problems of our coun-
tries, and the lack of experience in this type of 
operation have made it extremely difficult and 
laborious to secure the approval of these re-
financing programmes. 
Furthermore, there can be no doubt that 
as a result of the inadequacy of international co-
operation in this area, the present refinancing 
procedures give much higher priority to the 
payment of the external debt commitments than 
to the requirements of the economic develop-
ment process of the debtor countries. 
ment. As a result of this, when the Latin Ameri-
can countries began to service their external 
debt again they were able to buy back the bonds 
at a fraction of their issued value. In this way, 
the cost of the adjustment was shared between 
creditors and debtors in line with the risk ap-
praisal made on the international capital mar-
kets. 
At the present time, in contrast, the cred-
itors are mainly commercial banks, whose 
holdings are not easily tradeable and which, if 
they had to liquidate them in the market, would 
cause them substantial losses, jeopardizing their 
stability. Thus, the only option they have at pre-
sent is to offer to the debtors in difficulties 
either a refinancing or rescheduling of the debt. 
At the same time there is no suitable inter-
national mechanism to carry out renegotiation 
or refinancing processes other than the 'Paris 
Clubs' or aid consortiums, none of which deal 
with the debt with the private banks, which is 
what is of fundamental interest in the case of 
Latin America. 
T h e present system of renegotiation, be-
sides being inequitable, takes no account of the 
basic mutuality of interest which exist between 
the creditor countries and institutions and the 
debtor countries. The high social costs involved 
in the present adjustment could even lead to un-
controllable situations in the latter countries, 
and these would in turn have strong negative re-
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percussions on the situation of the creditor 
countries and banks. 
A new approach to the problems of the re-
gion's indebtedness based on criteria of equity 
and mutuality of interests should therefore tend 
towards solutions which would guarantee a 
more equitable international distribution of the 
adjustment and a continuation of the process of 
development of the debtor countries, as a way of 
preserving the standard of living in these coun-
tries and strengthening their future payment 
capacity. 
Under these circumstances, for the Latin 
American indebtedness problem to be satisfac-
torily resolved in the future, it will be necesary 
to establish a mechanism which includes the fol-
lowing conditions: 
a) it must provide for the establishment of 
an institutionalized procedure for restructuring 
the debt, perhaps as a joint effort between IMF 
and the World Bank; 
b) the reprogramming should include 
maturities of several years, establishing longer 
amortization periods and possibly changing a 
substantial part of the short- and medium-
term debt of certain countries into long-term 
obligations; 
c) additional resources should be granted 
to take care of the accumulated debt servicing 
and to maintain the operative capacity of the 
countries to handle their external trade; 
d) the cost of refinancing must be re-
duced; and 
e) access to additional public credits to 
stimulate economic development should be fa-
cilitated. 
1. The need for new institutional mechanisms 
The prolonged nature of the refinancing exer-
cises makes it advisable to promote the establish-
ment at the international level of new opera-
tional mechanisms for co-operating with the de-
veloping countries in the reprogramming pro-
cess, thus taking the place of the ad hoc 
mechanisms used up to now and taking advan-
tage of the experience built up by IMF in these 
fields. A refinancing service within the 
framework of the existing multilateral institu-
tions, with automatic voluntary access as a func-
tion of objective indicators and providing case-
by-case support for each country studied ac-
cording to the circumstances would be a decisive 
link in the chain of international co-operation 
which the present crisis and the meagre pros-
pects of the world economy make it essential to 
establish. 
Moreover, since trade aspects are of cru-
cial importance for the thorough solution of the 
problems of the debtor countries, consideration 
should be given to the possibility of arranging 
for the participation in these refinancing exer-
cises of institutions connected with international 
trade, such as GATT and UNCTAD, with a 
view to obtaining special facilities on the trade 
level. Among these facilities could be temporary 
provisions to open up markets further, or not to 
make adverse changes (stand-still), so as to ex-
pand the payment capacity of the debtor coun-
tries by increasing their exports. 
2. New terms and conditions for 
restructuring the debt 
An important objective in the new approach 
should be the reprogramming of the debt ser-
vicing for longer periods than those now in ef-
fect. 
Reprogramming which covers only the 
maturities of the next one or two years is not 
sufficient and subjects the debtor countries to a 
process of virtually non-stop refinancing. 
Likewise, the imminence of possible additional 
negotiations regarding the payment of capital 
and interest on the debt negatively affects the 
confidence of creditors and prejudices the re-
storation of an appropriate flow of additional 
credits to the debtor countries. We therefore 
feel that a more effective formula would be to 
reprogramme the corresponding maturities for 
a greater number of years than at present. The 
new payment schedules should also include 
longer grace periods and terms than those 
granted up to now. This will make it possible to 
create more suitable conditions for managing 
the balance of payments. 
These terms should be established so that 
they allow the debtor countries to maintain their 
per capita income during the adjustment 
period. Such a principle would be more accept-
able as a guiding criterion of the renegotiations 
if a special clause were included in the repro-
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gramming agreements providing for the incor-
poration of some degree of flexibility into the 
schedule of refinanced capital and interest pay-
ments, depending on the economic conditions 
of the borrower country. If the latter conditions 
improve, part of the fruits of this more favour-
able situation would be shared with the creditor 
banks through a moderate acceleration of the 
amortization and interest payments. 
For some heavily indebted countries, a so-
lution worth exploring would be the possible 
conversion of part of their outstanding short-
and medium-term external debt into long-term 
debt. These countries contracted short-term 
credits to finance investments which are socially 
beneficial but have a long maturation period. 
They therefore require an urgent reprogram-
ming of this financing. 
3. Additional resources for covering debt servicing 
and maintaining the operational capacity 
in external trade 
The mere reprogramming of the amortization 
of the external debt is not enough, however. It is 
necessary to obtain new resources, since in the 
short term the capacity for achieving a substan-
tial unilateral increase in the national saving of 
the Latin American countries is limited. 
From the point of view of the region as a 
whole, and subject to reasonable assumptions 
about the probable evolution of the world econ-
omy in the next few years, the external financ-
ing requirements for making the debt servicing 
compatible with the maintenance of the per 
capita income, as a minimum goal, involve the 
mobilization of much larger additional re-
sources than those currently being obtained 
through the refinancing agreements. 
Suggestions have been made in this respect 
whose importance and viability warrant careful 
attention: the capitalization of a substantial part 
of the interest on the external debt; the pay-
ment of a variable proportion of the interest 
with bonds tradeable on the international capi-
tal market; and the establishment within IMF of 
a special facility for financing the balance-of-
payments deficit caused by the rises in interna-
tional interest rates, providing for the granting 
of compensatory loans to the debtor countries 
during periods when these rates exceed their 
historical levels. 
Together with these additional resources, 
it will be of fundamental importance to main-
tain the credits from the private banking system 
for the financing of external trade operations 
within reasonable margins. As already noted, 
recent experience shows that the severe cuts 
made in this type of financing have created ex-
tremely difficult situations at a time when only a 
major reactivation of the external trade of the 
region can make possible a real way out of the 
difficulties presently being faced. 
4. Reducing the cost of refinancing 
From the point of view of equity, the private 
banking system practice of sharply increasing 
the cost of external credit when it becomes nec-
essary to reprogramme indebtedness seems 
highly questionable. In reality, the signing of a 
rescheduling agreement does not involve any 
additional risk for the private banks. Indeed, in 
practice, there is an improvement in the quality 
of an originally weak loan portfolio. 
This is because, in the first place, when a 
rescheduling agreement is signed, all of the fu-
ture payments generally have an official 
guarantee which also extends to private credits 
not always previously covered by such guaran-
tees. Secondly, these agreements are normally 
accompanied by the financial support of the 
IMF and the resulting commitment of the debt-
or country to continue certain adjustment pol-
icies which guarantee that in the future they will 
be in a better position to pay for the debt servic-
ing. 
Under these circumstances, it is not justifi-
able to increase the cost of the credit by raising 
the charges, a practice which in some cases has 
cancelled out the greater part of the benefit 
which the debtor countries would otherwise 
have obtained from the lowering of the nominal 
interest rates. 
5. The need for a considerable increase in public 
credit for development 
The adjustment policies which the Latin Ameri-
can countries are presently being forced to fol-
low require a sharp contraction of the fiscal def-
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icit, which generally takes the form of a reduc-
tion in public investment rather than the con-
taining of current expenditure. It is therefore 
important, in the present circumstances, to 
maintain an adequate and growing flow of long-
term credits from the international financial in-
stitutions, with a view to maintaining a high level 
of public investment which will ensure the con-
tinuation of the development process. The pre-
sent circumstances make it absolutely essential 
to strengthen the existing multilateral institu-
tions, especially IBRD and IDB, so as to substan-
tially increase their contribution to the financing 
of the economic and social development process 
of the region. 
T h e impression seems to prevail in certain 
circles in the developed countries that these in-
stitutions are merely agents which transfer sub-
sidized resources, and their role as stabilizers of 
the international financial system is ignored or 
underestimated, especially as regards the anti-
cyclical role which they play as a counterweight 
to the pro-cyclical operations of the private 
banks. The multilateral agencies thus help to 
give greater confidence in private financial mar-
kets, assuring the developing and also the de-
veloped countries of smaller disturbances in the 
amounts and forms of capital flows. 
Notwithstanding this, however, both IDB 
Many of the current problems resulting from 
the indebtedness of the developing countries 
could have been avoided if the international fi-
nancial agencies had had the funds, recycling 
mechanisms and facilities needed to allow for an 
adequate and equitable adjustment process at 
the world level. 
Instead, the financial power of the multi-
lateral agencies has weakened significantly in 
the 1970s and particularly in the last few years. 
The International Monetary Fund has 
exhausted its uncommitted resources and the 
recently agreed increase in quotas will only 
come into effect at the beginning of 1984, while 
the amount involved will be no more than 20% 
of the deficit anticipated that year on the cur-
and the World Bank have shown relatively 
sharp contractions in the loans they have au-
thorized for the region. As a proportion of the 
region's current account deficit, the loans au-
thorized by IDB have dropped from an average 
of 25% in 1965-1970 to 11% in 1975-1980; the 
corresponding figures for the World Bank are 
21% and 12%, respectively. 
It may be deduced from this that the 
doubling of the resources available for lending 
to Latin America on the part of these two in-
stitutions would be a reasonable minimum goal 
as a contribution to the medium- and long-
term external capital required by the region. 
The policies of these institutions would be 
much more positive if they led to the material-
ization of the olcl aspirations of the countries of 
the region that such agencies should modify the 
terms of their loans so as to provide a greater 
stimulus to domestic productive activity. This 
could be achieved by giving greater flexibility to 
a considerably higher proportion of their proj-
ect loans, expanding access to economic pro-
gramme credits, and increasing their capacity' 
for financing local costs. Furthermore, in the 
case of programme loans, it would be desirable 
to seek closer co-operation between the World 
Bank, IDB, and the International Monetary 
Fund. 
rent account of the developing countries, which 
is inadequate to take care of their external fi-
nancing needs. 
Similarly, it should be noted that IDB has 
had increasing difficulty in supplementing its 
ordinary capital resources, even though the 
great majority of its member countries have 
given strong support to this expansion. The 
agreements recently reached on this matter rep-
resent a step in the right direction, but they are 
insufficient. 
We feel that the time has come to expand 
the operational capacity of the Inter-American 
Development Bank with resources from other 
sources or through the creation of new loan 
funds which will enable this institution to con-
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siderably expand the flow of financial resources 
to Latin America. 
In the case of the World Bank, the difficul-
ties in restoring the operational capacity of the 
IDA are well known and are in addition to the 
restrictions on the mobilization of resources 
being experienced by the other multilateral 
agencies, 
We believe that the idea so often expressed 
of expanding the loan capacity of these institu-
tions by gradually increasing the asset/liability 
ratio with which they have come to operate 
would give them a considerable margin for ex-
panding their credit activities. 
In order to strengthen the presence of the 
multilateral agencies in the financing of Latin 
American development, special attention 
should be given to the co-financing arrange-
ments which may be organized with private 
banks. In this way, the flow of resources to well-
planned investment projects could be increased, 
and at the same time this would ensure the 
prompt materialization of these projects as well 
as transferring additional external resources 
which would make it possible to gradually im-
In the present circumstances, when the debtor 
countries are adapting their domestic policies to 
the new conditions of the international 
economic situation and the difficulties in their 
balance of payments, the international agencies 
which guide the adjustment process, such as the 
IMF, should also modify the conditionality of 
their loans so as to avoid incompatibilities in 
world economic policy and ensure that such 
policy helps to stimulate global activity. 
In accordance with this, it seems advisable 
that the IMF should make its theoretical con-
cept of the adjustment process more flexible, 
so as to adapt it better to the different economic 
prove the debt profile of the Latin American 
countries. 
With regard to the sharp drop in Latin 
America's foreign exchange reserves in 1982, it 
is interesting to note that this was part of a simi-
lar phenomenon at the world level. Thus, the 
official world foreign exchange reserves went 
down by over US$ 13 billion during 1982 and 
are still sinking in 1983, consequently tending to 
weaken any trend towards reactivation. 
This therefore seems a suitable moment to 
give decided support to the proposal to allocate 
Special Drawing Rights in order to increase in-
ternational liquidity. This would make it possi-
ble to distribute the burden of the external ad-
justment more equitably and over a shorter 
period than that required in order to increase 
the ordinary resources of the IMF. 
Furthermore, a direct 'link' between the 
allocation of SDRs and the financing of the de-
velopment of the peripheral countries would be 
a more effective way of providing relief for the 
debtor countries while at the same time securing 
an orderly expansion of the financial system. 
and social goals of its increasingly heteroge-
neous member countries. 
This suggests that less confidence should 
be placed in automatic adjustments through 
price incentives in private markets, and greater 
weight should be given to the guiding role of the 
State and direct instruments of adjustment 
which act on some of the main economic vari-
ables. 
At the same time, the IMF should have at 
its disposal suitable mechanisms for promoting 
adjustment in countries which have a surplus on 
their external accounts, so that the costs of this 
process are shared more equitably between 
these countries and the deficit countries. 
D. DOMESTIC POLICIES AND T H E CONDITIONALITY 
OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 
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E. T H E NEED FOR CO-ORDINATED REGIONAL ACTION 
IN FINANCIAL MATTERS 
The diversity and complexity of the individual 
situations as regards external indebtedness 
should not stand in the way of a broadly con-
certed agreement to act jointly in international 
forums and in dealing with the governments of 
creditor countries when seeking solutions of 
mutual interest to the present financial situation 
of the region. 
This would require, as a first step, a review 
of the proposals relating to the solution of the 
serious problems deriving from the external in-
debtedness of the region, with a special view to-
wards co-ordinating the joint action needed in 
order to realize these proposals. 
We also feel that this would be a good time 
to open a direct dialogue between the govern-
ments of the creditor countries and the Latin 
American governments acting as a co-ordinated 
group. This would represent a significant ad-
vance with respect to the present situation, in 
which the negotiations are being carried out 
fundamentally between the governments of the 
region on the one hand and the commercial 
banks and international financial institutions on 
the other. 
Thanks in good measure to the operation of 
the subregional integration arrangements, re-
ciprocal trade among the Latin American coun-
tries grew steadily until the mid-1970s. 
Moreover, since the beginning a high propor-
tion of that trade has been constituted by man-
ufactures, unlike exports to the industrialized 
countries, in which basic commodities and semi-
manufactures predominate. Nevertheless, in re-
cent years, beginning in the second half of the 
This option would not only make it possi-
ble to promote basic solutions to the difficulties 
referred to earlier but would also make it possi-
ble to grasp the true magnitude of the interna-
tional crisis and its possible remedies, taking 
into account the important political interests in-
volved. 
As an important supplement to these ini-
tiatives we recommend the creation of a Latin 
American external finance information centre, 
linked with one or more existing regional agen-
cies, which would make possible an increase in 
the various Latin American countries' knowl-
edge of the conditions in which the refinancing 
process and the financial market are operating. 
This centre could also serve to advise the gov-
ernments on the handling and solution of their 
problems generated by the external debt. 
Such strengthening of the regional infor-
mation capacity would also be in keeping with 
the initiative presently being taken by the cred-
itor banks to organize and co-ordinate their 
policies towards national debtors, for which 
purpose the industrialized countries have at 
their disposal the OECD and the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements. 
1970s, the relative importance of intra-regional 
trade became erratic and it lost dynamism, 
thereby giving rise to a certain amount of skepti-
cism concerning its possibilities. 
It would be a long task to go in depth into 
the numerous factors which have had an effect 
on the evolution of each integration scheme and 
have contributed to its slackening off in recent 
years. Factors in this phenomenon have in-
cluded the structural differences between the 
V 
The strengthening of regional co-operation 
and integration 
A. T H E RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESSES 
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countries, the heterogeneity of national 
economic policies and the difficulties inherent 
in processes of integration among developing 
countries. This process has also been affected, 
however, by other factors of a conjunctural na-
ture characteristic of the economic evolution of 
Latin America in recent years, such as the avail-
ability of abundant external resources and the 
dynamic growth of Latin American exports out-
side the region, which promoted the expansion 
of trade to extra-regional markets and in some 
sectors made regional markets less interesting. 
In addition, the advance of Latin Ameri-
can industrialization has, in recent years, been 
obstructed in some cases because some countries 
have suddenly opened their economies up to in-
ternational competition, or in others because 
they have not yet succeeded in stabilizing and 
intensifying the process of industrialization 
owing to their backwardness in terms of the pro-
duction of basic inputs and capital goods. In 
these ways, the capacity to supply manufactures 
to the regional market has suffered, as has the 
demand on that market for capital goods. 
T o say, therefore, that the integration 
movement has faltered only because of the way 
in which regional or subregional institutions or 
the legal instruments which govern them have 
operated would definitely constitute a severely 
limited view of the complex and varied origins 
of that phenomenon. 
It should also be noted that the potential 
for co-operation does not depend only on the 
nature and scope of the integration instru-
ments. In the past decade ways and means of co-
operation have emerged in Latin America 
which are profoundly significant for the 
Such a change of attitude is more vital than ever 
today, since intra-regional co-operation and 
especially reciprocal trade are acquiring special 
importance and urgency in view of the growing 
restrictions on the expansion of exports to the 
rest of the world and the priority given to a style 
of development which is more inward-looking 
economic linkage and progress of the countries 
of the region. Meaningful and promising exam-
ples of such ways are to be found in the bina-
tional projects to develop water resources, the 
improvement of the common transport and 
communications infrastructure, integration of 
border areas, the petroleum agreement to aid 
the Caribbean and Central American countries, 
joint ventures in several fields, and other forms 
of co-operation at the scientific and technologi-
cal as well as the economic levels. 
However, there has recently been wide-
spread doubt concerning the present and future 
importance of regional co-operation. Moreover, 
the various regional integration schemes have, 
instead of becoming stronger and more effec-
tive, been going through a period of institu-
tional lethargy or have come up against danger-
ous and recurrent crises which have resulted in 
the stagnation or even regression of the integra-
tion processes. 
Those trends have in the present cir-
cumstances been aggravated by the impact of 
the unfavourable international economic situa-
tion and the payments difficulties now experi-
enced by the great majority of the Latin Ameri-
can countries. 
For this reason, unless there is a significant 
turnaround and a more positive attitude to re-
gional co-operation is established, these nega-
tive elements will continue to erode the achieve-
ments made and there will be an increase in the 
skepticism shown by business groups and even 
by the governments themselves, which are, in 
the last analysis, the agents on whose action the 
broadening and strengthening of the process of 
regional integration depend. 
than the one which prevailed in the region dur-
ing the decade preceding the current crisis. 
Since the prospects for North-South co-
operation are dim and the benefits which Latin 
America is likely to derive from the eventual 
economic reactivation of the great centres are 
long in coming, it becomes of vital importance 
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to look to the region anew and make regional in-
tegration and co-operation a basic factor in the 
effort to revitalize the Latin American 
economies. 
In the present circumstances, a decided 
movement in this direction would make it pos-
sible to achieve three fundamental objectives: 
more intensive use of the region's idle or under-
utilized productive capacity; increased effi-
ciency through the use of economies of scale, 
which have been severely eroded by the drop in 
production, and, finally, a reduction in the re-
gional use of foreign exchange per unit of pro-
duction. 
All this would be of decisive help in achiev-
ing greater collective economic security and 
would make a form of development increasingly 
based on regional demand more viable. 
If, on the other hand, the integration 
movement is not revitalized (and it will not be 
unless the governments make a definite politi-
cal commitment), the costs may well be very 
high. Because of the extremely unfavourable 
nature of the present international economic 
situation, the unilateral action which countries 
may take to improve their position in the inter-
national economic scenario might give rise to a 
ruinous process of competition between the 
countries of the region in terms, for example, of 
repeated devaluations or ever-increasing export 
subsidies. 
In short, it may be said that now, more 
than ever, Latin America needs a regional-level 
production and complementarity programme 
with suitable promotion and protection instru-
ments which simultaneously promote a more ef-
fective integration process and a more equitable 
distribution of the benefits of that process 
among all the countries of the region. This pro-
cess should also be accompanied by policies 
whereby the Latin American countries concert 
their international action more closely, and it 
would constitute a basic element in increasing 
the degree of autonomy of the region's 
economic and social development. 
In order to progress in this direction, we 
consider that in the present circumstances it is 
essential to reaffirm those Latin American poli-
cies which are aimed at achieving: 
a) as much complementarity as is possible 
in production, trade and the utilization of trans-
port, insurance, technological and other ser-
vices, on the basis of the principle of Latin 
American preferences and as a way of achieving 
an effective and efficient import substitution 
process at the regional level. To achieve this 
objective it will be necessary to act flexibly and 
pragmatically, making the fullest use of the 
existing integration instruments, special ar-
rangements between governments and other 
economic agents, and all possible means of 
non-traditional co-operation; 
b) the initiation of an effective process of 
institutional articulation and co-ordination 
among the various entities working in the field 
of regional integration and co-operation, with a 
view to lending consistency and direction to 
their initiatives and activities. This process may 
be long and complex, but it would make it possi-
ble to proceed clearly and firmly towards the 
building of an authentic regional economic 
community; 
c) the consolidation and broadening of 
the joint bargaining power of the countries of 
the region so as to correct the structural and 
conjunctural asymmetry in their external 
economic relations and effectively defend their 
common interests, together with those of the 
other developing regions, against other coun-
tries or groups of countries. 
In order to make progress towards the at-
tainment of these objectives, it will be necessary 
in the first place to increase regional co-opera-
tion in the fields of trade, finance, the produc-
tion and supply of food and energy, and the de-
velopment of transport; secondly, there will be a 
need for stronger co-operation with the rela-
tively less developed countries and with other 
developing regions; and, finally, it will be neces-
sary to link up properly the Latin American in-
stitutions engaged in the processes of regional 
co-operation and integration. 
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C. T H E DEFENCE AND EXPANSION OF INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE 
As we already saw, intra-regional trade has 
tended to weaken in recent years. In order to re-
verse this trend and take full advantage of the 
potential offered by such trade, measures aimed 
at the following objectives should be adopted: 
a) to defend the levels of intra-regional 
trade already reached and keep it from being 
subjected to new limitations or obstacles; 
b) to establish a margin of regional prefer-
ence; 
c) to promote flexible forms of trade, 
agreed upon within the existing integration 
schemes, in the framework of multilateral disci-
plines. 
a) Strengthening intra-regional trade and pre-
venting its erosion 
One of the first objectives should be to stop 
the erosion of terms of access in intra-regional 
trade and prevent the application of additional 
obstacles to its expansion. 
T o achieve this aim it is necessary to put 
into operation higher-level machinery for con-
sultation among the officials responsible for for-
eign trade in the Latin American countries, in 
order to deal with any disputes which may arise, 
solve the administrative problems posed, pro-
vide information on any restrictions which are 
applied, become familiar with existing systems 
for export promotion, and explore ways to 
minimize the impact of the present economic 
situation and of the restrictive trade measures 
accompanying the severe balance-of-payments 
crises in our countries. 
At the same time, it is indispensable to 
adopt a regional-level standstill commitment 
which would provide a basic foundation on 
which any additional phase of the trade aspects 
of regional integration could be built, thereby 
making it unnecessary to start once again to lift 
the measures imposed as a result of the 
generalization of restrictions among Latin 
American countries. An additional advantage of 
an agreement of this type would be that it would 
automatically constitute a form of preference 
compared with the treatment given to third 
countries. 
This initiative could take the form of an 
administrative decision suspending the im-
plementation of all measures for limiting intra-
regional trade adopted by every Latin American 
country as from a certain date, on the basis of 
partial agreements or of a formal multilateral 
instrument. 
b) Establishment of Latin American preferences 
Regional Tariff Preferences (RTP) are en-
visaged in the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo estab-
lishing ALADI. For its part, resolution 5 of the 
Council of Ministers of that regional grouping 
states that the preferences "should extend as far 
as possible to the entire tariff universe". The 
RTP are destined in this way to provide a multi-
lateral link among the member countries of 
ALADI. 
We feel, however, that the establishment 
of Regional Tariff Preferences should lead to 
the introduction of trade integration machinery 
for the whole of Latin America. We therefore 
consider it desirable to formulate an ad hoc 
agreement for adoption by all the Latin Ameri-
can countries. In order to ensure its rapid im-
plementation, it should not have to be ratified 
or adopted by the individual national legisla-
tions in the normal manner. It could consist of 
an agreement for the partial or total suspension 
—but only on a temporary basis— of customs 
duties. 
Several studies have been prepared on the 
various options available for avoiding the diffi-
culties raised by implementation of the RTP, 
particularly with regard to the heterogeneity of 
the tariff systems of the different member coun-
tries, the partial preferences already in force as 
a result of negotiations held within ALADI, and 
the preferences existing among the Andean 
countries. For all these cases, technically ade-
quate solutions which would facilitate adoption 
of the preferences have been suggested. 
The decisions recently taken within 
ALADI on negotiating the common heritage 
could pave the way for reaching, in the briefest 
time possible, the political decision to imple-
ment this system of preferences. Its importance 
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is all the greater today because of the need for 
maintaining clear and firm elements of multilat-
erality in a scheme of trade relations which 
necessarily is going to have to exploit, pragmati-
cally and to the maximum, the opportunities of-
fered by partial complementation agreements 
and bilateral processes for maintaining and ex-
panding trade flows. Without disregarding the 
importance of the latter, it appears particularly 
vital, both politically and economically, for the 
region as a whole to establish regional preferen-
tial action which would lead to global-level trade 
integration machinery. 
It is obvious, however, that under the cur-
rent economic circumstances tariff machinery 
by itself would not be sufficient to avoid other 
obstacles opposing the expansion of intra-re-
gional trade. However, tariff preferences can 
generate trade, both by encouraging explora-
tion of new preferential markets and by improv-
ing the conditions of access to markets which are 
protected by relatively high tariff levels or by in-
stitutional features which make them nearly im-
penetrable to imports not coming from the in-
dustrialized countries. 
Trade preferences may go beyond the 
tariff sphere and extend to a comprehensive-
ly Latin American outlook concerning pref-
erences, as a result of which, under the present 
circumstances, they could become a fundamen-
tal anti-cyclical instrument for resisting the 
drop in exports to areas outside the region and 
also make possible a reduction in imports from 
outside Latin America. 
This outlook concerning preferences 
could be firmly applied to the State purchases 
which currently make up a significant portion of 
the imports of most of the Latin American 
countries. Most of the large infrastructure 
works and the largest purchases of capital goods 
conducted in the region are in the hands of the 
State or of public enterprises, while in some 
other cases the investments are made by private 
enterprises, which enjoy official financing or 
guarantees. Therefore, a regional system of pref-
erences in public tenders open to foreign enter-
prises may be extremely important in increasing 
trade and reactivating the demand for capital 
goods, which has decreased as a result of the cuts 
in public investment taking place in many coun-
tries in the region. 
c) New forms of regional trade 
In the current circumstances, ALADI of-
fers a flexible legal framework for constructing 
an area of economic preference through a vari-
ety of mechanisms. Among other instruments, 
explicit recognition is given to the part which 
may be played by agreements of partial scope in 
diverting trade flows. 
However, we believe that, while the 
'realism' of the potential held by agreements of 
partial scope should be recognized, multilateral 
discipline should also be observed as a way of 
avoiding the re-introduction of competitive or 
exclusive bilateral trends which would check 
possible advances towards permanent multilat-
eral forms and, eventually, towards a true re-
gional economic community. 
It is in this context that we should envisage 
the role of subregional, bilateral and partial 
agreements, and of the balanced or adjusted 
trade which has recently acquired new momen-
tum. 
It is true that the latter suffers from de-
fects or elements of trade diversion that are not 
always effective or economically advisable. How-
ever, as recent trends in the international econ-
omy have demonstrated, these mechanisms 
are especially attractive as a response to the 
emergencies raised by the crises in the balance of 
payments and should be explored among the 
countries of the region. The food and fuel sec-
tors provide a suitable area for this type of trade 
agreement. 
For example, in 1979 the Latin American 
countries imported food and beverages in an 
amount of slightly more than US$ 10 billion, of 
which only US$ 3 billion came from other Latin 
American countries. That is to say, the extra-re-
gional imports represented approximately two-
thirds of the total Latin American imports of 
those products. In the same year the Latin 
American countries exported slightly more than 
US$ 25 billion of those same products out of 
the region. 
In the fuel area, it should be pointed out 
that in 1979 the Latin American countries im-
ported US$ 20.7 billion of such goods, of which 
only slightly more than US$ 8 billion originated 
in the region. That is, 60% of the regional fuel 
imports came from the rest of the world, which 
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leaves an ample margin for developing recip-
rocal trade. 
The extra-regional imports of these two 
product groups as a whole are equivalent to 
nearly the total figure for intra-Latin American 
trade, while exports of them out of the region 
are, in both cases, far higher than the extra-re-
gional imports. This provides an idea of the op-
portunities existing for expanding trade among 
the Latin American countries, especially with re-
spect to food and fuel, trade in which is to a 
large extent in the hands of public or State-con-
trolled enterprises. 
This shows how important it is to extend to 
the region as a whole the attempts already being 
made bilaterally to establish mechanisms for in-
creasing opportunities for expanding balanced, 
compensated trade. 
D. FINANCIAL CO-OPERATION 
Examination of the current problems of region-
al trade and the limitations on its expansion 
points to the great importance of expanding 
and strengthening regional mechanisms for fi-
nancial co-operation. 
We consider it of high priority and feasible 
in the short run to revitalize and interconnect 
several already-existing intra-regional finan-
cing schemes. Among these are the multilateral 
payments mechanisms (Central American) 
Clearinghouse, Caribbean Multilateral System 
of Compensatory Payments, and the ALADI 
System of Reciprocal Payments of Balance and 
Credits); the trade balance and balance-of-pay-
ments mechanisms (Santo Domingo Agree-
Latin America is facing the risk of growing ex-
ternal dependency in satisfying its ever-increas-
ing food consumption, for the prospects for the 
future evolution of demand and the production 
of food for the region as a whole indicate that, if 
current trends do not change, Latin America's 
net trade deficit of food products with the rest 
of the world will rise sharply. This will be seri-
ous not only in terms of its influence on the bal-
ment, Central American Monetary Stabilization 
Fund, and the Fund for Debit Balance Finan-
cing in the Central American Clearinghouse), 
and export credit financing and insurance 
(Latin American Export Bank, Andean Trade 
Financing System, and Latin American Associa-
tion of Export Credit Insurance Agencies). 
These are initiatives which, for the most part, 
have already been studied and could increase 
their contribution to reciprocal trade and to the 
saving of foreign currency in the region. 
In the area of project financing, it is worth 
while recalling that the region already has four 
subregional bodies —the Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration, the Caribbean 
Development Bank, the Andean Development 
Corporation and the River Plate Basin Financial 
Fund— all of which are in a position to absorb 
additional intra- and extra-regional resources. 
The latter resources could become a highly use-
ful complement to the efforts in the area of 
domestic savings which the region must carry 
out in order to accelerate its development. 
In the nearly 25 years of its existence, the 
Inter-American Development Bank has played 
a very significant role as a body for promoting 
the development of Latin America, combining 
resources from the countries of the region with 
those from outside the region. However, it 
would have even more importance in the Latin 
American integration process if it placed more 
emphasis on promoting the financing of intra-
Latin American exports and expanded its action 
in favour of regional co-operation, including 
the promotion and financing of joint investment 
projects among several countries. 
anee of payments but also with respect to the 
worsening of the external vulnerability of such a 
strategic sector as this. 
Therefore, the Latin American countries 
have recently established, in the framework of 
SELA, an Action Committee whose objective is 
to develop a System of Regional Food Security. 
Under this Committee a programme of action 
has been established whose objectives are as am-
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bitious as the food situation of the region is dis-
turbing. In other words, in this area Latin 
America already has the institutional and plan-
ning framework necessary for meeting one of 
the most important challenges that it will have to 
face in the coming years. We therefore consider 
it of the highest importance for all the Latin 
American countries to participate actively in this 
venture and for its full implementation to be en-
sured through the granting of the political sup-
port which it deserves. 
The situation is similar in the energy area. 
Through the Latin American Energy Organiza-
tion (OLADE) and its Latin American Energy 
Co-operation Programme (PLACE), the Energy 
Co-operation Programme for the Countries of 
Central America and the Caribbean established 
by the San José Agreement, and various bilat-
eral and even multinational initiatives, an exten-
sive network of agreements and programmes of 
action has been established in the region, which 
should make it possible for Latin America to 
meet more adequately, in the future, the prob-
lems arising from its commercial and technolog-
ical vulnerability in the energy sector. 
Under the current circumstances, we feel 
that it is particularly important to give the politi-
cal and financial support needed in order for 
these initiatives, and especially the Latin Ameri-
can Energy Co-operation Programme, to devel-
op fully. Their influence on the economic reac-
tivation of the region, the maintaining of the 
level of export income of the producer coun-
tries, the saving of foreign currency by the im-
porting countries, and the consolidation of re-
gional technical development is enormous, and 
it could be detrimental to Latin America to ig-
It does not appear possible to achieve the dual 
ideal of accelerated and relatively autonomous 
development and greater regional equity with-
out special help for the countries of Central 
America and the Caribbean, either within the 
respective integration schemes or by seeking ad 
hoc instruments which would allow non-mem-
ber countries to associate themselves with them. 
nore them when the contribution they can make 
is so great. 
In the case of transport, many kinds of ac-
tion may be taken to improve the administration 
and technology of the merchandise movements 
stemming from trade between the region and 
the rest of the world and in the region itself. It 
is mainly a question of reducing costs, improv-
ing competitiveness with respect to the services 
offered by third countries, and procuring a 
growing proportion of the extensive freight and 
insurance market, which is mainly in the hands 
of businesses outside of the region today. It is 
sufficient to point out that in 1982 the region 
paid to foreign enterprises approximately US$ 
8 billion in maritime freight, that is, approxi-
mately 70% of its total expenditure in this 
category. 
In order to tackle these problems and seek 
suitable solutions for them, it is considered nec-
essary to have a forum —which does not exist at 
present— in which to study at the regional level 
the questions of the institutional strengthening 
of sea transport and transport facilitation. 
This forum, which could be in-
stitutionalized in the form of a Permanent 
Maritime Transport Committee within SELA, 
would enjoy the technical support of ECLA and 
of the regional integration bodies. Its objective 
would be the integral study of the problems af-
fecting maritime transport and related matters 
in Latin America, with a view to promoting the 
development of national merchant marines, in-
creasing the region's share in the movement of 
its international trade, and improving intra-re-
gional maritime services. 
New geoeconomic spaces could be created in 
this way, enriching the possibilities of integra-
tion and co-operation and of regional political 
co-ordination. 
To a great extent the legal infrastructure 
for this already exists, since the 1980 Treaty of 
Montevideo makes it possible to grant non-re-
ciprocal preferential treatment to developing 
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non-member countries of ALADI, such as the 
Central American and Caribbean countries, and 
other non-members of integration schemes, 
such as Cuba, Haiti, Panama and the Dominican 
Republic. Although there are significant diffi-
culties involved in an initiative designed to in-
crease commercial and economic links between 
the countries of ALADI (which includes the An-
dean Group) and the Central American and 
Caribbean countries, we are also aware that the 
region will achieve its true political and 
economic significance only when there is a net-
work of effective links uniting all the countries 
in the Latin American community, while avoid-
ing the presence of elements which tend to re-
produce inequitable relations between them. 
In this framework of ideas, we consider 
this to be a particularly favourable occasion for 
making a special effort to fully incorporate the 
Caribbean and Central American countries into 
this process. 
Central America is a zone that is especially 
affected by the international economic crisis and 
by serious political tensions which are threaten-
ing to destroy the region's peace. We believe 
that the rest of Latin America cannot remain in-
different towards that situation. We therefore 
propose that a Latin American emergency pro-
gramme in support of Central America should 
be adopted, so that the countries of that subre-
gion will be able to moderate the effects of the 
crisis and revitalize their economic and social de-
velopment process. That programme could he 
based on two main groups of measures. 
Firstly, Latin America should foster an in-
itiative aimed at regional economic co-operation 
with the Central American countries, helping 
them to promote their economic growth and, in 
this way, relax political tensions. Although this 
action would call for some financial support 
from the other Latin American countries, its 
main virtue and potential would lie in the assis-
There is one last aspect of Latin American co-
operation which we would like to mention with 
special emphasis on this occasion, since we feel it 
is an important factor in determining the pos-
tance these countries would lend to help the 
Central American countries obtain a higher 
level of global external financing. 
Secondly, in accordance with the stipula-
tions of the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo setting 
up ALADI, the most developed countries in the 
region could facilitate the access of Central 
American products to their markets through 
preferential trade treatment. 
In the case of the Caribbean countries, 
their history and rich cultural heritage differ in 
many aspects from those of the rest of the Latin 
American countries. As they have been gaining 
independence, they have been joining regional 
organizations, sharing with and within them 
their problems and aspirations. Under the pres-
ent circumstances, these countries are fully 
aware of their region's special identity and of 
the need for strengthening their unity to meet 
the challenges of their economic, social and 
political development. 
For their part, it is in the best interests of 
the other Latin American countries —particu-
larly those in the vicinity of the Caribbean re-
gion— to make maximum efforts to support the 
economic development of the Caribbean coun-
tries and to strengthen the relevant co-opera-
tion structures. 
In view of the seriousness of the interna-
tional situation's repercussions on the economy 
of the Caribbean countries, we feel it is neces-
sary for the Latin American countries with the 
greatest potentialities, despite their present 
economic limitations, to expand their facilities 
for supporting this subregion by means of an in-
itiative to be analysed and projected jointly with 
the Caribbean countries. 
The continuation of the energy co-opera-
tion programme of Mexico and Venezuela in 
favour of the Central American and Caribbean 
countries is very encouraging in this connection. 
sibilities for strengthening regional co-opera-
tion. We refer to the present lack of co-ordina-
tion among Latin American institutions. 
In recent years, many regional specialized 
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agencies have arisen, a large number of commit-
tees or bodies dependent upon these agencies 
have been established, and action plans and re-
gional strategies related to the most varied areas 
have been set up. Many of these mechanisms 
duplicate or overlap those which have arisen in 
the framework of regional and subregional 
trade or physical integration agreements or the 
regional bodies and specialized agencies of the 
United Nations system or the inter-American 
system. Each of these institutions generally has 
its own governmental machinery and sec-
retariat. All this constitutes a thickly interwoven 
institutional fabric which lacks joint structures 
and co-ordination. There is no mechanism for 
establishing any form of co-ordination among all 
or at least some of these institutions. Further-
more, many of these agencies often follow 
parallel and in some cases even contradictory 
paths. 
All these facts make it advisable to establish 
some type of central mechanism for the ade-
quate co-ordination and promotion, from a 
high political level, of the activities and initia-
tives being proposed by this variety of institu-
tions. Rather than avocating collective control 
machinery, we are proposing that they should 
be integrated at the functional level and pro-
It seems clear that the basic balance-of-pay-
ments and indebtedness problems of the region 
can be solved in the medium and long term only 
by improving the terms of world trade and put-
ting a sustained programme for the expansion 
of regional trade into effect. Unless the neces-
sary external resources can be generated by 
means of trade, it will not be possible to find a 
solution to the present balance-of-payments 
bottlenecks or to cope with the debt servicing re-
quirements. 
It is probable that in the next few years the 
growth rate of international trade will be rela-
vided with common guidelines, thus reinforcing 
the value of the activities being developed by 
one or the other. 
In accordance with its original mandates, 
SELA could assume the functions of guiding 
and co-ordinating those Latin American institu-
tions which deal with negotiation activities, both 
in the harmonizing of common positions to-
wards third countries and in regional integra-
tion and co-operation. 
We feel that in this way more co-ordinated 
and effective attention would be given to many 
initiatives which often are not implemented ef-
fectively, due to the institutional weakness of 
their bases or because they compete with similar 
initiatives coming from other forums. Alterna-
tively, it is necessary to ensure support for initia-
tives which lose vitality after being taken, since 
only through the support of the governments is 
it possible to ensure their survival and develop-
ment. 
The advance of the regional integration 
and co-operation processes towards their final 
goals must at the same time be linked up with 
the institutional structure called for by the de-
velopment and consolidation of the Latin Amer-
ican community. 
tively slow, more or less in line with the sluggish 
evolution of the world product projected by var-
ious specialized bodies. This is partly due to the 
loss of impetus suffered by the process of in-
creasing trade openness of the industrialized 
centres which accompanied and promoted their 
rapid economic development in the period from 
the end of the war up to the mid-1970s. This 
has also held back the progress which was being 
made towards a new international division of 
labour at the world level. 
Moreover, the principles and rules on 
trade liberalization which have governed inter-
VI 
Concerted regional action to deal with the 
problems of international trade 
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national trade under the aegis of GATT for 
more than 30 years are being progressively 
eroded. It was impossible to reverse this nega-
tive tendency at the last ministerial meeting of 
GATT, held at the end of 1982. Thus, the in-
creasingly discriminatory and covert nature of 
the measures which countries have been taking 
has meant that in practice the exceptions to the 
GATT regulations now cover a very high prop-
ortion of international trade, affecting Latin 
America in particular. 
Latin American exports of basic commodities 
and manufactures —the expansion of which is 
essential for the region's development— face in 
the markets of the industrialized countries a set 
of tariff barriers (graded according to the de-
gree of processing of the exports) as well as non-
tariff barriers. Both types of protection have a 
limiting and discriminatory character and are 
gradually bringing about a situation where the 
central countries have acquired the capacity to 
manage as they wish their trade with the de-
veloping countries and especially Latin Ameri-
ca. This management may take place in a selec-
tive and non-continuous manner or, if neces-
sary, may be broader, more intensive and more 
frequent. 
For these reasons, we consider that it is an 
essential task for the region to organize and take 
advantage of its bargaining capacity in order to 
have the real possibility of applying symmetrical 
trade treatment to exports originating from de-
veloped countries which apply protectionist pol-
icies: an aspiration which has been repeatedly 
manifested and approved by the Latin Ameri-
can countries. 
In order to formulate and adopt these 
measures, however, it is necessary first of all to 
have timely and accurate information on the 
characteristics and scope of the protectionist in-
struments used by the industrialized nations, as 
well as the products or product groups in re-
spect of which the Latin American countries 
could possibly apply compensatory measures. 
Subsequently, the application of such measures 
could be agreed and carried out in various alter-
In order to cope with these unfavourable 
trends, Latin America can take three mutually 
complementary types of action. On the one 
hand, it can define and adopt policies aimed at 
strengthening its joint potential for responding 
to and negotiating with the industrialized 
centres. Secondly, it can use its presence in dif-
ferent multilateral and bilateral forums to put 
forward its claims more actively. Finally, it can 
diversify its markets in order to improve the 
possibilities for selling its exports. 
native ways: one valid only for the Latin Ameri-
can countries affected by one or more specific 
forms of protectionism in the centres; another 
at the level of agreements taken within the exist-
ing subregional groupings, and a third, broader 
type which would constitute an agreement en-
tered into by the entire region. 
As regards basic commodities, since these 
represent around 80% of the total value of Latin 
American exports (approximately 40% if petro-
leum is excluded), it is immediately clear how vi-
tally important and urgent it is to increase the 
level of their processing, to defend their inter-
national prices, and to organize greater and 
more stable bargaining power vis-à-vis the con-
sumer countries. 
Although basic commodities are so impor-
tant to the developing countries, the main 
agents in world trade in this field are the de-
veloped market economy countries, which gen-
erate close to 60% of the world exports of these 
goods and absorb over 70% of the total imports 
of them. This means that in the case of some 
particular products such as cereals and cotton, 
the success of the measures proposed at the in-
ternational level will depend on the degree to 
which the developing countries can organize 
their bargaining power to counterbalance that 
of the industrialized countries, either as produc-
ers or consumers. To this end, Latin America 
should define differentiated policies for each 
basic commodity or group of commodities, in 
line with their particular characteristics, the 
kind of action or measures to which they lend 
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themselves, and the role which the region could 
play in each case. 
In this connection, there is an urgent need 
to support the commodity agreements as fully as 
possible, in line with the objectives our countries 
identified at the recent meeting held at Car-
tagena in preparation for the sixth session of 
UNCTAD, which were validated shortly after-
wards when the Group of 77 met in Buenos 
Aires. 
In those cases where there are no interna-
tional agreements which meet the interests of 
the countries of the region adequately or where 
attempts to seek solutions through the tradi-
tional agreements have proved sterile, Latin 
America should make the most, at the bargain-
ing table, of the opportunities available to it 
through its combined purchasing power. In this 
regard, it is urgent to broaden and strengthen 
the bargaining power of the existing producers' 
associations (GEPLACEA and UBEC) and of 
the multinational marketing firms (COMUN-
BANA and MULTIFER) so that the success of 
these may serve as a basis for the establishment 
of similar bodies for other commodities which 
are important to Latin America, 
The commodity export strategy also calls 
for the systematic incorporation as one of its es-
sential dimensions of rising degrees of national 
processing and marketing of such products. 
The measures defined in this direction —a 
number of which will affect the operations of 
the transnational corporations— will have a 
leading role to play in the formulation of an in-
tegral policy for the commodity-producing and 
exporting sectors. As some Latin American 
countries have already been doing, it would be 
desirable for national authorities to incorporate 
into their foreign investment policies measures 
aimed at inducing the transnational corpora-
tions to increase their industrial exports of man-
ufactures or semi-manufactures and generate 
increasing trade surpluses in their operations. 
B. ACTION IN MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL FORUMS 
We do not wish to repeat here the lines of action 
emphasized by the countries in the Group of 77 
and the Latin American Group, but to lay stress 
only on those which are most urgent and rele-
vant in the present circumstances. The region, 
in co-ordination with the Group of 77, should 
continue pressing for the consideration and 
negotiation, within the context of GATT, of the 
gradual reduction of the various types of tariff 
and non-tariff restrictions now being applied. At 
the same time, for the identification of the prob-
lems involved in this field and the adoption of 
common positions by the developing countries, 
the institutional facilities existing in UNCTAD 
offer a good alternative whose timeliness and 
appropriateness become all the more obvious in 
view of the current Sixth General Conference of 
this organization. 
The countries of Latin America must also 
act together to ensure that the benefits deriving 
from the Generalized Systems of Preferences 
(GSP) are expanded. The various limitations 
from which these systems suffer from the point 
of view of their transitory nature, their unilat-
eral characteristics, their selectivity, the rules re-
garding origin and quantities permitted and 
their use of the system of graduation have 
caused widespread frustration. It is therefore 
urgently necessary to improve them through 
the UNCTAD multilateral forum, and for this 
purpose the joint determined action of the re-
gion is indispensable, albeit without prejudice to 
bilateral negotiations with each of the countries 
or regions of the industrialized world which op-
erate GSP schemes. 
One of the forms of protectionism prac-
tised by the developed countries which is most 
harmful because of its dimensions, diversifica-
tion and negative effects on the economic activ-
ity of the region is that of the subsidies for pro-
duction and exports granted by those countries 
to certain key production activities. 
For these reasons, we consider that one of 
the crucial issues which can and must be 
negotiated with the developed countries is that 
of subsidies. These negotiations should be car-
ried out in the appropriate forums and with a 
great sense of urgency, since the code on sub-
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sidies currendy in existence is inappropriate 
and ineffective. While these negotiations are in 
course it will be necessary to have some com-
plementary operational support and technical 
analysis machinery within the framework of 
UNCTAD. 
Furthermore, it is also essential to redou-
ble efforts to strengthen and expand the Inte-
grated Programme for Commodities agreed 
within UNCTAD, both as regards the gradual 
adoption of international agreements between 
producers and consumers for 18 selected prod-
ucts and as regards the complementary initiative 
for the establishment of a Common Fund for 
commodities. Especially as regards the Common 
Fund, it is our firm belief that the Latin Ameri-
can countries can play an effective leadership 
role in the process of obtaining the signatures 
and ratifications required in order to complete 
the entry into force of the Agreement setting up 
this Fund. 
C. THE NEED FOR DIVERSIFICATION OF THE MARKETS FOR 
LATIN AMERICAN EXPORTS 
Because of the growing inability of the markets 
of the central industrialized countries to absorb 
additional Latin American exports, as well as 
the increasingly serious difficulties in gaining 
access to them, a policy aimed at the expansion 
and strengthening of other markets is clearly 
justified and of high priority. This policy should 
include exploration of the opportunities offered 
by trade with the centrally-planned economies, 
especially those of Eastern Europe which are 
members of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA). Trade with the CMEA 
countries has shown relatively rapid growth in 
recent years, although it is true that it started 
from a very low level. A considerable number of 
trade and payments agreements have been 
signed between countries of the two areas, many 
of which go beyond the purely trade area and 
include matters of industrial, scientific and tech-
nological co-operation. The existing experience 
therefore gives grounds for viewing in a positive 
manner the prospects of greater expansion of 
reciprocal trade, although this may partly de-
pend on the obtaining of satisfactory solutions 
for the establishment of multilateral agreements 
for settling trade balances. 
It is worth noting that the Latin American 
countries are interested in diversifying their ex-
ports to the CMEA countries —which currently 
consist almost entirely of primary com-
modities— through the export of manufac-
tures. In addition, the possibility should be 
explored of inducing the CMEA countries to 
grant long-term preferential contracts in re-
spect of products of interest to the region, with-
in a new system of international trade relations. 
D. CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER DEVELOPING REGIONS 
High priority should be given to strengthening 
the bonds of co-operation with other developing 
regions, pursuing the efforts already initiated 
with countries of Africa and Asia. 
This co-operation should go beyond the 
purely commercial area so as to attain and oper-
ate in a broader context of reciprocal co-opera-
tion within a framework of integration where 
co-operation is promoted not only in trade but 
also in the fields of technology, transport, the 
exchange of experience and joint investments. 
In this connection there are of course fac-
tors which restrict the possibility of expanding 
trade relations, such as limited supplies for ex-
port; problems of transport, communications 
and financing; the absence of preferential ar-
rangements and, above all, the shortage of reli-
able and timely information. 
One of the priority tasks is to seize the op-
portunity available in the present circumstances 
to intensify the action taken in these fields of co-
operation, within which the establishment of a 
global system of trade preferences among de-
veloping countries can play a significant role, as 
can the mobilization of the developing countries 
themselves through the existing regional institu-
tions. 
BASES FOR A LATIN AMERICAN RESPONSE... / Carlos Alzamora T. and Enrique V. Iglesias 45 
VII 
The challenges raised by the crisis and a 
new form of development 
The preceding analyses demonstrate the great 
external vulnerability of Latin America in the 
face of the international economic crisis and the 
limited possibilities offered by the current policy 
of the international financial agents. As a re-
sponse, we advocate concerted Latin American 
action in the international sphere in order to ob-
tain a thorough-going structural adjustment 
which will make it possible to defer over time 
and distribute more equitably the costs facing 
the countries of the region today. 
Latin America has been meeting the crisis 
by rigorously adjusting its economies and facing 
up to high social and economic costs. Up to now, 
in most cases, the results do not appear to justify 
the sacrifices. If the current conditions con-
tinue, recovery will continue to be slow, and the 
social and political costs will be even higher. 
Mobilization of the Latin American poten-
tial for international negotiation and regional 
co-operation is therefore becoming essential for 
achieving a more equitable distribution of costs 
among the countries of Central and Latin 
America. This redistribution of costs will ex-
pand the countries' degree of manoeuvrability, 
avoiding the creation of undesirable and 
dangerous social tensions. Although we have 
had to concentrate our recommendations on ur-
gent current problems, and especially those aris-
ing from external relations, there is no doubt 
that action in the internal policy sphere is essen-
tial if the current recession is to be handled with 
fairness and a long-term view of the existing 
problems. Such an approach would also provide 
international action with appropriate domestic 
support in the political, social and economic 
sphere. 
Taking a structural view of the problems 
afflicting us, the crisis has pointed up the long-
term unfeasibility of development strategies 
which have once more proven their extreme ex-
ternal vulnerability and their tendency to create 
inequitable societies. 
For this reason, in our approach to short-
term adjustment problems we would also like to 
call attention to the need for substantial changes 
in the current modalities of our economic and 
social development. In this context we believe 
that the measures being put forward in interna-
tional and regional spheres should, while redu-
cing short-term external imbalances, create the 
foundations for different forms of growth and 
distribution. 
The new modality for development should 
aim at substantive changes in external economic 
relations, correcting the structural imbalances 
which have characterized them in the past. 
What is more, it should be acknowledged that, 
even if the hoped-for reactivation does occur, 
both in the economies of the centres and in 
world trade, the extra-regional relations of 
Latin America will make it necessary to envisage 
as restrictions the high initial indebtedness and 
a new international financial context. Even if 
the debt is successfully renegotiated, servicing it 
will continue to affect the Latin American 
economies, and it is highly improbable that net 
external financing will again play a role similar 
to that which it played during the 1970s. Fur-
thermore, it is unlikely that protectionism and 
the instability of world trade will cease to be sig-
nificant problems, which makes rather question-
able the strategies basing the economic 
dynamism of the region on exports to the 
centres. Therefore, the new arrangements for 
development should be based more and more 
on the domestic and intra-regional markets and 
—to the extent that South-South relations be-
come strengthened— on the markets of the rest 
of the developing world. 
The needs and pressures connected with 
the crisis, by reducing considerably the import 
levels at which the previous forms of economic 
growth operated, once more open up pos-
sibilities for substitution in the national and re-
gional spheres. Efficiency of operation, in our 
opinion, is indispensable in this new stage of im-
port substitution. In any case, the serious cur-
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rent economic deterioration does not leave 
room for wasting the scant resources available. 
Furthermore, we feel it is absolutely necessary 
to orient the production changes in the new 
modality of development towards a regional 
market. In this connection, the recommenda-
tions made concerning regional co-operation in 
trade, financing and other spheres should be 
considered as first stages in a long-term process 
of a multilateral nature. 
The new modality of development must 
also meet other requirements in the domestic 
sphere. In the area of equity, a suitable policy 
should be developed for keeping up appropri-
ate levels of consumption and employment op-
portunities for the broad masses. With regard to 
medium- and long-term expansion, it is indis-
pensable to preserve the physical and industrial 
infrastructure which it cost so many years of ef-
fort to build. Furthermore, in the key sectors for 
the new economic expansion it is essential that 
levels of investment, which is some cases now 
threaten to be insufficient even for covering the 
depreciation of the existing production capac-
ity, should be recovered as soon as possible. 
These challenges are in many cases in 
open contrast with the previous patterns of con-
sumption and savings. Thus, in our view, the 
new economic policies must aim at much greater 
austerity than in the past —austerity in both 
public and private consumption and, most espe-
cially, in that of the high-income strata. The re-
duction of these strata's diversified consump-
tion, which is also highly dependent on the ex-
terior, will not only facilitate the social consen-
sus, but also make it possible to attain the objec-
tives of domestic savings, relieve the pressure on 
the balance of payments, and make it easier to 
control inflation. 
The complexity of the problems we are 
facing and the nature of the changes needed 
place very strict demands on the management 
of the economy. However, the most difficult ob-
stacles will arise at the political and institutional 
level. Both the short-term measures and the 
transition towards a new development strategy 
call for a firm and wise hand on the part of the 
State. The varied political experience of Latin 
America makes it clear that there are no 
mechanisms or institutions which, by them-
selves, can ensure that the economic process will 
proceed efficiently and properly. 
The market has economic and political vir-
tues, but these do not include the unaided abil-
ity to guide development or cope effectively 
with crises. We believe that in periods of crisis it 
is vital for the State to play a central role in the 
management of the economic process and in the 
co-ordination and harmonization of efforts. We 
must not, however, fall into the technocratic il-
lusion of thinking that this kind of intervention 
alone is any guarantee of a reasonable degree of 
efficiency. 
Co-ordination refers first and foremost to 
the need for the whole State apparatus —cen-
tral and regional, administrative and decen-
tralized— to act in an integrated and harmoni-
ous manner. Concerted action has to do in par-
ticular with the capacity of the State apparatus 
to reflect the interests of the social groups, 
guide their action and direct wills towards com-
mon goals. 
Although the co-ordination of the State 
apparatus is the necessary and primary source 
of its efficiency, the harmonization of efforts be-
tween the public and private and the labour and 
entrepreneurial sectors is also an essential fea-
ture of the kind of planning which is so sorely 
needed at present. 
Only by combined action directed towards 
common goals will societies be able to solve their 
pressing problems and provide an answer not 
only to the concerns of the moment but also to 
the challenges of the future. 
